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1Abstract
We present a model where agents can obtain exclusive control rights over a common
resource through an exclusion contest. The alternative is shared control entailing
ineﬃcient exploitation. If the agents engage in confrontation, they invest resources in
order to win the conﬂict at the cost of the foregone production possibilities and the
risk of exclusion. We show that if the over-exploitation associated with open access
is severe enough and conﬂict is not too ﬁerce, agents have incentives to engage in
conﬂict and that the resulting allocation Pareto dominates free access.
JEL codes: D74.
Kewywords: Commons, Exclusion contest, Conﬂict technology.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Traditionally, economists have embraced the idea that the creation of new property
rights responds "to the desires of the interacting persons for adjusting to new beneﬁt-
cost possibilities"1. This is to say that the emergence of property is the outcome of
some sort of group consensus since the new rights can make everybody better oﬀ.
However, this view ignores what history tells us, namely that property rights were
often the fruit of a (sometimes brutal) exercise of force; and that losers were not
compensated.
Indeed, the creation through coercion of property rights over resources previously
of open access has been an endemic cause of conﬂict. An early example is the devel-
opment in England of private rights to land, traditionally of common property: A rise
in the price of wool increased the value of land for sheep farming uses. This triggered
the political initiative of upper classes aimed at establishing private ownership by
excluding serfs2. In the 18th century, the Acts of Enclosure ﬁnally achieved the full
emergence of the new legal system.
A more recent example of this phenomenon are the events in Mauritania in 1989
where the Moor elite of the country, anticipating the increase in land values due to the
construction of a dam in the Senegal River, modiﬁed the legislation governing land
ownership. This eﬀectively abrogated the rights of the black Africans to continue
1Demsetz (1967), p. 350.
2"Where enclosure involved signiﬁcant redistribution of wealth it led to widespread rioting and
even open rebellion" (North and Thomas, 1973.)
3their economic activities on that area. After the subsequent explosion of violence in
response, the black Mauritanians who lived alongside the river were expelled from
the country and their properties seized3.
This historical evidence points to an obvious but neglected fact: Property rights
given by law or custom are not always the fruit of a societal endeavor gently adjusted
through "legal and moral experiments".4 Instead, ownership systems were many times
created and altered by means of the conscious coercive eﬀort of agents, who spent
their time and resources in appropriation. The achievement of suﬃciently strong
control rights by these means was the main step to the recognition of the "legal"
forms we observe today. This process did not -by deﬁnition- beneﬁt all participants.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the creation of property rights by coercive
means. It explores a very simple general-equilibrium model where agents depend on
the output they can generate from a resource. Examples include minerals, a ﬁshery,
or a pasture. Agents are able to foresee that free access will yield over-exploitation,
i.e. the "tragedy of the commons", and low individual payoﬀs. So they have the
possibility to engage in an exclusion contest whose winner is granted total control
over the resource by excluding the losers. Hence, eﬀective property rights are created
and obtained through confrontation5.
3For many other examples of "resource capture" type conﬂicts worlwide (in the Jordan and Nile
River basins, China, Philippines or Indonesia) see Homer-Dixon (1994).
4Demsetz (1967), p. 350.
5Conﬂict or confrontation do not necessarily imply violent behavior. "Lobbying" or "inﬂuenc-
ing" are also resource-consuming means to attain control rights: For instance, Britain and Norway
4As any type of conﬂict, the exclusion contest is probabilistic. Agents can aﬀect its
outcome by investing part of their initial endowments into eﬀort. The cost of these
coercive activities are both the foregone production possibilities and the risk of being
excluded.
So if agents choose to contest open access, they have to decide the share of their
endowments they will invest in the contest and the amount they will devote to pro-
d u c t i o ni fc o n t r o lo ft h er e s o u r c ew e r et ob ea t t a i n e d .I tt u r n so u tt h a tt h i sg a m eh a s
a unique interior Nash Equilibrium (Proposition 2).
The alternative to confrontation is the open and peaceful access to the resource.
By settling, the agents agree on not ﬁghting each other, so they get secure but shared
control.
We show that, if the over-exploitation associated with the free access regime is
severe and the returns to scale of conﬂict eﬀort small enough, agents will contest open
access in order to get exclusive property rights. Moreover, and in sharp contrast with
the existing literature, this conﬂict has a welfare enhancing eﬀect making coercive
exclusion Pareto dominate open access (Proposition 3).6
obtained preferential exploitation rights over the oil and gas found in the North Sea because they
were able to diplomatically impose the ’smallest distance to the coast’ criterion to other contending
nations.
6Recently, several papers have dealt with the allocation of resources between productive and
coercive activities in the absence of well-deﬁned property rights. Relevant contributions include
Skaperdas (1992), Hirshleifer (1995) and Grossman and Kim (1995). The ﬁrst paper assumes that
production is carried under common ownership and contested afterwards; whereas in ours, common
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2.1 The Model
Two agents (individuals, social groups or countries7) labeled as 1 and 2 possess E
units of endowment each that can be transformed into eﬀort in an exclusion contest
(eﬀort henceforth) or in labor in the exploitation of a resource. We denote these
investments by ri and li respectively, where ri + li ≤ E.
Agents only derive utility from the output they are able to get from that resource.
They can obtain monopolistic access to it through the exclusion contest: The winning
agent obtains full control and is enabled to exploit the resource by using her labor;
the loser is excluded and gets nothing. This contest is probabilistic. Given r1 and r2,
the conﬂict technology determines each’s player probability of winning the contest.
We adopt a simple functional form (axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996)) with agent i








where m ≥ 0 denotes the returns to scale or decisiveness of eﬀort8.
The alternative to the exclusion contest is a peaceful agreement granting access
ownership arises only when all agents prefer to settle rather than to initiate conﬂict. The other two
papers assume, as we do, that agents ﬁght for the right to produce output individually; but they do
not consider any alternative to conﬂict, so peace is never a possibility. But more importantly, all
these models render conﬂict activities as socially wasteful.
7In the case of groups one can assume that they behave as unitary agents.
8Hirshleifer (1995).
6rights to both agents. In that case, control is shared, there is open access and agents
exploit the resource non-cooperatively. Under this property regime, agents do not
internalize the associated negative externalities and the possibility of over-exploitation
arises.
Our formalization of the free access problem will follow a simpliﬁed version of the
canonical model by Cornes and Sandler (1983): The amount of output produced is
given by a twice-diﬀerentiable production function f(·), and depends only on the total
labor input. This function is concave and satisﬁes f(0) = 0 and f0(0) > 0. Moreover,
it is assumed that f(·) attains a maximum at L∗ < 2E.9 Output is distributed in
proportion to individual labor contributions.
If agents agree on sharing the control of the resource there is no contest and their







f(li + lj),i =1 ,2.
At the symmetric Nash equilibrium of this non-cooperative game the following
result holds true:
Proposition 1 (Cornes and Sandler, 1983) If two agents have free access to a
common resource, labor is oversupplied with respect to the eﬃcient level such that the
9The maximum assumption keeps our model as simple as possible but still equivalent to the one
by Cornes and Sandler (1983). These authors use an increasing production function and a unit cost
of labor in order to generate a payoﬀ function attaining a maximum; but including such cost in our
model would call also for introducing a cost of eﬀort.





LF =0 , (1)
provided that LF ≤ 2E.
Eﬃciency would be attained if l1 + l2 = L∗, so the marginal productivity and
marginal cost of labor are equal, i.e. f0(l1 + l2)=0 . However, agents under free
access do not take into account that they decrease the marginal productivity of the
resource when increasing their labor input. This implies that LF >L ∗.
For the rest of the paper we will assume that the solution to (1) exists, i.e. LF ≤
2E.
2.2 The Exclusion Game
The alternative to the peaceful (and ineﬃcient) free access is coercive exclusion:
Agents engage in confrontation in order to obtain monopolistic access at the risk of
getting themselves excluded.
Let us introduce the exclusion contest in our simple version of the commons prob-
lem: If either of the agents refuses to settle and share control the two players engage
in open conﬂict and play the Exclusion Game. In this non-cooperative game each










f(E − ri) i =1 ,2. (2)
8Players therefore maximize (2) subject to 0 ≤ ri ≤ E.10 Note that the cost of
eﬀort are simply the foregone production possibilities.
Proposition 2 The Exclusion Game admits a unique Nash Equilibrium character-





f(li) i =1 ,2. (3)
Proofs are contained in the Appendix. In contrast with the free access regime,
the resource is always underexploited under conﬂict; both because only one agent
ﬁnally exploits it and because part of her endowment has been devoted to eﬀort in
the contest.11
Note that the Exclusion Game induces a ’rat race’: An increment in eﬀort by the
opponent makes the exclusion of an agent more likely and decreases the opportunity
cost of eﬀort. Agents thus oversupply eﬀort instead of labor.
In the next Section we explore the eﬃciency of incorporating coercion into the
creation of property rights over open access resources.
3T h e E ﬃciency of Exclusion
In this section we present the main result of the paper: When conﬂict is used to
create property rights over an open access resource it may have a welfare enhancing
eﬀect and Pareto dominate shared ownership.
10Since agents do not derive utility from the endowments they do not use it is clear that li = E−ri.
11Although the former is a suﬃcient condition.
9The intuition for this result is fairly simple. It is clear that, from a social point of
view, exclusion is potentially welfare enhancing because it prevents over-exploitation.
But, more importantly, there are substantial incentives at the individual level to
engage in confrontation since victory in the contest exclusive property rights.
Agents will compare the payoﬀ under free access, derived from expression (1),
and the equilibrium payoﬀ in the Exclusion Game, characterized by the symmetric
solution to (3). So if one agent prefers to initiate conﬂict rather than settle both
agents will do so since the equilibria of the two games are both symmetric.
But conﬂict is not always welfare enhancing. If agents’ productive capabilities are
too low (because their endowments are small) there is no advantage from confronta-
tion: They would be clearly better oﬀ by settling and sharing the property of the
resource since it will not be heavily over-exploited.
L e tu sd e n o t eb ylF the optimal labor input in the open access case when there is






E if E<L ∗
L∗ otherwise.
It is plain to see that if f(LF) ≥ f(lF) agents are always worse oﬀ under con-
ﬂict. Hence, a necessary condition on the endowments and the production technology
for conﬂict to prevail (and therefore to be welfare enhancing) is that the resource
should be heavily over-exploited under free access; or, in short, agents should be
"big" enough.
10Proposition 3 Suppose that f(lF) >f (LF). Then there exists a threshold M such
that conﬂict Pareto dominates free access if and only if m ≤ M.
Even when players are suﬃciently "big", the scope for a welfare enhancing conﬂict
is also limited by the intensity of confrontation: If the conﬂict technology is very
decisive (for instance, if the quality of weapons or the tolerance of society towards
inﬂuence activities is high), agents invest a big share of their endowments in the
exclusion contest. Confrontation becomes then so ﬁerce that the resource is left
virtually unexploited, agents prefer to settle and free access prevails12.
In short, when coercion is used to obtain exclusive property rights, only one agent
exploits the resource and there is no over-exploitation. Then if the ineﬃciencies
associated with shared ownership are strong enough and conﬂict is not too resource
consuming (the decisiveness parameter is low enough) both agents will want to engage
in conﬂict and therefore the resulting allocation will Pareto dominate free access.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Although simple, the model presented in this paper is robust to straightforward mod-
iﬁcations. It is true that, with more than two agents, confrontation would be more
ﬁerce and the set of conﬂict technologies giving rise to the exclusion contest would
shrink. But at the same time, free access would become less attractive since over-
12Our condition on m resembles the condition on this parameter (m<1) obtained by Hirshleifer
(1995) in order to ensure the stability of anarchy, a situation where agents ﬁght but retain viable
shares of output.
11exploitation would worsen and the condition needed on the production technology
would relax. Similarly, the introduction of a substitute for the open-access good (e.g.
leisure) would reduce the amount of conﬂict expenditures but this would in turn
generate more incentives to initiate conﬂict.
Two ﬁnal remarks. First, we have obtained conﬂict in a model with identical
agents. On the contrary, historical examples seem to support a strong vs. weak
pattern: In England, the upper classes excluded the serfs and in Mauritania the
Moor elite did the same with the black Africans. However, prior diﬀerences in (ill-
deﬁned) "power" are self-explanatory of conﬂict (and thus meaningless). Our result
goes exactly in the opposite direction: It is conﬂict what establishes diﬀerences in
power by creating diﬀerences in the access to resources.13
Finally, our contribution should be interpr e t e dw i t hc a u t i o n ;i tm u s tb er e g a r d e d
from a purely positive perspective. We do not advocate that property rights over open
access resources should be allocated through confrontation: Though maybe superior
to free access, coercive exclusion is still a second best. However, it is necessary to
admit that such scenario is likely to arise whenever agents are not able or willing to
contract for amicable welfare enhancing arrangements; and that it indeed arose in
many historical instances of the "emergence" of new property rights.
13In contrast with "purely" economic activities, conﬂi c tc a n n o tb e n e ﬁt all participants: The Pareto
domination result holds ex-ante; ex-post, the distribution of output ends up being very unequal since
one of the agents is excluded (although the total output produced may still be higher than under
free access).
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0(E − ri),i =1 ,2.
This condition yields a unique best response for any level of eﬀort by the opponent.
A f t e rs o m em a n i p u l a t i o ni ti sc l e a rt h a ti na n ye q u i l i b r i u mt h ec h o i c em a d eb yb o t h









0(E − r). (4)
It is deﬁned over [0,E]. It is clear than the values of r that make φ(r) equal
to zero are the Nash Equilibria of our Exclusion Game. Now we will show that an
equilibrium exists indeed and it is unique.
First, one can show that if φ(r) ≤ 0 then φ(r) is strictly decreasing in r:T h e













00(E − r) ≤ 0,
w h e r et h el a s ti n e q u a l i t yh o l d sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tw h e nφ(r) ≤ 0 it is clear from (4)
that f0(E − r) ≥ 0.
F i n a l l y ,n o t et h a tw h e nr → 0,φ (r) →∞ . On the other hand φ(r) →− 1
2f0(0) < 0
when r → E. Since φ(r) is continuous, the previous result ensures that there exists
a unique value for r∗ that makes φ(r∗)=0 .S u c hr∗ is the unique (and symmetric)
Nash Equilibrium of the Exclusion Game.
14P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . First we show the equilibrium level of eﬀort is increasing




f(E − ri) − pif
0(E − ri)=0 ,i =1 ,2. (5)
By the Implicit Function Theorem, the best response eﬀort r∗
i(rj) is increasing in










































R2 f(Ei − ri)(1 + mr
m
i [lnrj − lnri]).
Hence, the equilibrium level of eﬀo r tm u s ti n c r e a s ew i t hm since there r1 = r2.
When m =0 , the exclusion contest becomes a fair lottery and payoﬀsa r es i m p l y
1
2f(lF), that is greater than uF
i by assumption. As m increases the total labor input of
the agent decreases but the winning probabilities are still p1 = p2 = 1
2 by symmetry.
Since the production function is continuous and f(0) = 0, t h e r em u s te x i s tat h r e s h o l d




i . Below that threshold, the output under
conﬂict is still greater than the output under free access. Since this holds for both
agents, the resulting allocation Pareto dominates free access.
15